tions.6 Permissive presumptions "may, but need not, be relied on by the jury" in reaching its verdict; mandatory presumptions must be followed unless rebutted. 7 The Court has applied a more relaxed standard of due process review to permissive than to mandatory presumptions.
This note argues that, in developing the contemporary mandatory-permissive standard, the Court has misunderstood the effects of presumptions on juries. Presumptions that are "permissive" in theory may nevertheless be "mandatory" in fact, thereby leading some juries to convict regardless of their beliefs and inclinations. Thus, these legal presumptions may undermine the moral sense and political function of the jury.
Part I of this note shows, through doctrinal analysis, that the mandatory-permissive distinction is an anomaly in the Court's jurisprudence. Part II shows that this distinction is at variance with a substantial body of empirical social science research. This part suggests that jurors are influenced significantly by the authorityladen legal structure surrounding judicial instructions on all presumptions-however permissive in theory. Part III proposes that the distinction between "mandatory" and "permissive" presumptions be abandoned, and that "reasonable-doubt" due process scrutiny 8 be applied to all presumptions. This proposal would help to prevent the improper use of presumptions and ensure that jury verdicts reflect jurors' actual beliefs.
I. EVOLUTION OF CRIMINAL PRESUMPTION DOCTRINE

A. Presumptions as Empirical Generalizations
The Supreme Court's recent treatment of criminal presumptions dates back to the 1943 case of Tot v. United States, 9 which announced a "rational connection" test for the validity of presumptions. If there is no "rational connection" between the presumed fact and the proved fact, or if the connection between the two is arbitrary or inconsistent with ordinary experience, the pre-6. See County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979) ; H.R. Doc. No. 46, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1973) (proposed rule of evidence).
7. Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 157. 8. The Supreme Court has held that the due process clause protects the accused against conviction "except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (emphasis added) ; accord Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977) .
9. 319 U. S. 463 (1943) .
sumption violates the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
1 0
The Tot Court intended to set limits on the power of Congress and state legislatures to make the proof of one fact (or set of facts) evidence of an ultimate, inculpatory fact. 1 Only if reason and experience support the inference-that is, if it is probable that if the proved fact is true then the inculpatory fact will also be true-will the prosecution be relieved of its burden of production and proof. Tot thus set standards for convictions obtained solely on the basis of inferential proof.' 2 In taking as its theoretical point of departure the view that reason and experience must support a presumption, the Tot Court indicated its adherence to a specific conception of presumptions. 1 3 According to this conception, presumptions express general truths about the way people behave in certain circumstances; the party against whom a presumption operates is a particular case to which the general truth of the presumption applies.' 4 Inferential proof of presumed intent runs as follows: It is generally true that if a defendant has done X, he wanted Y to 10. Id. at 467. 11. here the inference is so strained as not to have a reasonable relation to the circumstances of life as we know them, it is not competent for the legislature to create it as a rule governing the procedure of courts."). The statute at issue in Tot made it a crime for convicted felons and "fugitives from justice" to receive firearms or ammunition that had been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. Mere possession was deemed to satisfy the required jurisdictional element of interstate transportation. Federal Firearms Act § 2(f), 52 Stat. 1250 Stat. (1938 (repealed 1968) .
12. The Supreme Court decisions in United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965) , and United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965) , are virtually identical applications of Tot's "rational connection" test. The Court in Romano, however, strained to distinguish the offense of "carrying on" the illegal operation of a still from the (allegedly narrower and "markedly different") offense of "possession, custody, and control" of a still. Since "almost anyone" present at a still is "very probably" assisting in "carrying on" its operations, the presumption was sustained in Gainey, 380 U.S. at 67-68; cf Romano, 382 U.S. at 140-41 (discussing the Gainey reasoning). But in Romano, the connection between presence and possession was found to be "too tenuous to permit a reasonable inference of guilt." 382 U.S. at 141. " [T] here was a much higher probability that mere presence could support an inference of guilt in the former case than in the latter." Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 157 n.16.
13. Tot, 319 U.S. at 467. 14. As the Supreme Court stated in MobileJ. & K.C.R.R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 42 (1910) , "the strength of any inference of one fact from proof of another depends upon the generality of the experience upon which it is founded." Justice Cardozo, writing in Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934) , stated the same principle from the vantage point of "reasonable expectations." In the case of a true presumption, said the Justice, " [w] hat is proved must be so related to what is inferred. . . as to be at least a warning signal according to the teachings of experience . . . . [E] xperience must teach that the evidence held to be inculpatory has at least a sinister significance.
... Id. at 90. Justice Cardozo further ob-occur; this defendant has done X; therefore, this defendant intended Y to occur.
15
The formulation of the first, general proposition is the crucial step; if it "express[es] the normal balance of probability,"' 6 its application will be upheld in particular cases. But if the general proposition is itself inherently improbable, then imposing it on particular defendants is unfair. According to this view, the problem with formulating presumptions is in creating inferences that closely approximate the actual state of the world and of human behavior. Tot and its progeny view presumptions as attempts to express empirical, probabilistic connections between events, and to treat particular cases by reference to empirical generalizations.17
The "rational connection" test of Tot was strengthened in Leary v. United States.' 8 Leary was charged with violating a federal statute that made possession of marijuana sufficient evidence to authorize conviction for "knowingly" and "illegally" importing marijuana from abroad.' 9 The Leary Court asserted that a crimiserved that possession of land, unless by an individual ineligible for citizenship, carried with it "not even a hint of criminality." Id.
For an example of the reasoning in Tot, see the statute at issue in Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1 (1929) , which provided that "[elvery insolvency of a bank shall be deemed fraudulent, and the president and directors shall be severally punished by imprisonment and labor in the penitentiary.
... . This rather severe presumption was successfully attacked as "unreasonable and arbitrary"; the proof sufficient to make a prima facie case "points to no specific transaction, matter or thing as the cause of the fraudulent insolvency or to any act or omission of the accused tending to show his responsibility. . . . The connection between the fact proved and that presumed is not sufficient. Reasoning does not lead from one to the other. " Id. at 7. Cardozean analysis can also reach the same result: Merely being the president or director of an insolvent bank does not reasonably put one on notice of fraud. Nor does it "awaken a belief that [one] is guilty if he fails to come forward with excuse or explanation." Morrison, 291 U.S. at 90. This analysis is particularly useful in attacking presumptions that invoke unrelated jurisdictional elements. See, e.g., Tot, 319 U.S. 463 (1943) (presumption of interstate or foreign commerce connected with firearm possession by a felon); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) (presumption of illegal importation tied to marijuana possession); Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973) (presumption of federal mail use linked to possession of stolen U.S. Treasury checks); see also Nesson, supra note 1, at 1215-21 (inferences relating to jurisdiction).
15. See generally Ullmann-Margalit, On Presumption, 80J. PHIL. 143 (1983) . 16. Tot, 319 U.S. at 469. 17. The Gainey and Romano decisions are clearly based on generalized empirical propositions. The Gainey presumption "did no more than 'accord to the evidence, if unexplained, its natural probative force.'" 380 U.S. at 71 (quoting McNamara v. Henkel, 226 U.S. 520, 525 (1913) nal presumption is irrational or arbitrary unless there is "substantial assurance" that the presumed fact "more likely than not" follows from the proved fact. 20 On the basis of detailed empirical findings, the Court determined that it could not say with any assurance that a majority of marijuana possessors "knew" the source of their marijuana. Thus it would be unreasonable to presume that Leary knew that his marijuana had been illegally imported.
'
The "more likely than not" criterion of Leary is a more precisely formulated statement of Tot's theory of empirical probability. The "more likely than not" test means that a presumption will be upheld if it is correct more than 50 percent of the time. Probably nothing more than judicial delicacy and an appreciation of the inherent imprecision in such matters prevented the Court from expressing this rule mathematically. But the Leavy Court indicated on several occasions that, if "a majority of marijuana possessors 'kn[e]w' that their marijuana was illegally imported," the statute would be upheld. 22 20. Id at 36. The introduction of this "more likely than not" language required the Court to delve into the realm of empirical proof and to take judicial notice of legislative facts. In addition to vast amounts of testimony and congressional committee reports, Justice Harlan's clerk consulted approximately 25 studies on the sources of marijuana and on the beliefs of marijuana smokers as to those sources. See id at 53 n.l 16 (noting proudly that "there is no indication that in any of these [lower court] cases the court had before it or took into account even a fraction of the evidence which we have considered"). This support was necessary to sustain the Court's novel form of argumentation and to determine whether a presumption "more likely than not" expressed a valid inference to the truth of the presumed fact.
21. Id. at 52-53; cf Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970) , in which the defendant was convicted under provisions of a federal statute (covering "narcotic drugs") which were virtually identical to the one at issue in Leary. The Court upheld Turner's conviction on heroin charges, but reversed his conviction on cocaine charges. The Court found "overwhelming [empirical] evidence" that heroin consumed in the United States is illegally imported; therefore, "[tlo possess heroin is to possess imported heroin." Id. at 415-16. According to the Court, "Turner doubtless knew that his heroin came from abroad," unless he had practiced "a studied ignorance to which . . . [he was] not entitled." Id. at 416-17. The Court concluded that, with respect to heroin, the statutory presumption satisfied a "reasonable-doubt" standard, see text accompanying notes 25-37 infra, as well as the "more likely than not" criterion.
On the other hand, the Court found that more cocaine was lawfully produced in this country than was smuggled in from abroad. Since there was a substantial possibility that Turner's cocaine had been stolen, rather than imported, the presumption of "knowing, illegal importation" did not meet the "more likely than not" test when applied to cocaine. Id at 422-24.
22. Leary, 395 U.S. at 46; see also id. at 37-39, 46-47, 52-53. The Court noted that "[t]he process of making the determination of rationality is, by its nature, highly empirical ....
Id. at 35 (quoting Gainey).
The Leary decision illustrates how the analysis of a presumption's constitutional validity becomes "logically divorced from . . .[the particular facts presented by the State] and based [in- stead] on the presumption's accuracy in the run of cases." 23 " [T] hat petitioner himself testified at trial that he had no knowledge of the marihuana's origin [was irrelevant]."24 If the validity of presumptions depends on "the strength of the connection" between proved facts and presumed facts, evidence bearing on the presumed fact is logically irrelevant. Indeed, if the Supreme Court's theory of presumptions is followed to its ultimate conclusion, the presumptions themselves become the "facts" on trial.
B. The Imposition of Reasonable-Doubt Constraints
The applicability of reasonable-doubt due process scrutiny to criminal presumptions was established in the 1970 decision of In re J4inship. 25 Winship concerned a juvenile proceeding in which a determination of guilt, made "by a preponderance of the evidence," subjected a young boy to confinement in a training school for up to six years. The Court reversed on grounds that "the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." 26 23. Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 159. 24. Leary, 395 U.S. at 32 n.55. Despite the fact that the defendant was well educated [Dr. Leary was a Professor of Psychology at Harvard University] and had recently traveled to a country that is a major exporter of marihuana to this country, the Court found the presumption of knowledge of importation from possession irrational. It did so, not because Dr. Leary was unlikely to know the source of the marihuana, but instead because 'a majority of possessors' were unlikely to have such knowledge. Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 159 n.17. This does not mean that the presumption at issue was irrebuttable or conclusive; the Leary Court noted later in the same footnote that the presumption was "by its terms rebuttable."
A problem arose in Leary because the jury might have convicted solely on the basis of a presumption that did not meet the requirements of due process. See Leary, 395 U.S. at 31 ("For all we know, the conviction did rest on that ground."); Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 159 n.17 ("[There] was.., no certainty [in Leary] that the jury had not relied upon the presumption."). Thus Leary's own testimony was "irrelevant," because he should not have beenforced to rebut a constitutionally impermissible presumption in order to win an acquittal. In effect, the presumption shifted the burden of proof. See note 37 infra and accompanying text; see also Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 85 (1983) ("An erroneous presumption on a disputed element of the crime renders irrelevant the evidence on the issue because the jury may have relied upon the presumption rather than upon that evidence.").
25. 397 U.S. 358 (1970) . 26. Id. at 364.
Barnes v. United States 27
was the first important post-Winship decision reviewing a criminal presumption. In Barnes the defendant was convicted of knowingly possessing stolen United States Treasury checks. The trial court instructed the jury that "[p]ossession of recently stolen property, if not satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance from which you may reasonably draw the inference and find, in the light of the surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence in the case, that the person in possession knew the property had been stolen." 28 After a review of Gainey, Romano, Leary, and Turner-the teachings of which were "not altogether clear"-the Supreme Court noted that the challenged jury instruction in Barnes was a traditional inference deeply rooted in the common law. 2 9 Barnes had been found in possession of stolen Treasury checks payable to persons he did not know, and had provided no plausible explanation consistent with innocence. "On the basis of this evidence alone," the Court concluded, "common sense and experience tell us that petitioner must have known or been aware of the high probability that the checks were stolen." 30 In fact, the Court decided, the presumption met not only the "more likely than not" criterion of Leary, but also the reasonable doubt standard. 3 1 A presumption meeting the former standard, but not the latter, had yet to come before the Court.
The Winship principle was strengthened in Mullaney v. Wilbur. 32 A Maine law required a defendant to prove, by a "fair preponderance" of the evidence, that he had acted "in the heat of passion on sudden provocation" in order to reduce a murder charge to manslaughter. This requirement amounted to a rebut- Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960) . They also criticized the majority for not undertaking empirical inquiries, such as those made in Leary and Turner, which might have uncovered other sources of stolen checks that did not implicate federal jurisdiction. As Justice Douglas put it, "[wlithout some evidence or statistics . . . we have no way of assessing the likelihood that this petitioner knew that these checks were stolen from the mails." Barnes, 412 U.S. at 852 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
32. 421 U. S. 684 (1975) . 33. The Maine law comported with early common law doctrine in that unlawful homicide was "presumed to be malicious," and thus punishable as murder, absent proof that it
430
[Vol. 38:423 The State of Maine argued that Winship did not apply, since the presence of provocation was not a "fact necessary to constitute the crime" of felonious homicide in Maine, but merely a factor bearing on the extent of punishment. The Court responded that on this reasoning Maine could simply redefine all assaults as a single offense, punishable as murder, and then provide affirmative defenses for all elements of aggravation.
4
If the Winship decision were limited by a state's definition of crimes, Maine could thus shift the entire burden of proof to the defendant without substantively changing its criminal law. This would, of course, "undermine many of the interests that [Winship] sought to protect." 35 Under Maine's "fair preponderance" burden of proof, a finding of murder could result even where the evidence indicated that the defendant as likely as not deserved a significantly less severe sentence. 36 The Mullaney Court emphasized that the burden of proof in a criminal trial cannot be shifted to the defendant by the operation of a presumption affecting the degree of culpability or extent of punishment. The availability of affirmative defenses does not relieve the prosecution of its obligation to establish beyond a reasonable doubt all facts upon which the degree of culpability and extent of punishment turn. the reasonable doubt standard, and "permissive" presumptions, which need only meet the "more likely than not" test of Leary.
9
The Court appears to have created this distinction out of whole cloth. As Justice Powell observed on behalf of four dissenters, "I have found no recognition in the Court's prior decisions that this distinction is important in analyzing presumptions used in criminal cases."
40
At any rate, according to the Ulster County theory the jury must find the presumed fact, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, when given a mandatory presumption. The jury may, but need not, find the presumed fact in the presence of the proved fact when given a permissive presumption. 4 1 An alternative definition used by the Court is: A mandatory presumption authorizes conviction "even if thejury disbelieved all of the testimony" and merely relied on the inferential proof afforded by the presumption; 42 a permissive presumption, by contrast, may not be the "sole and sufficient" basis for a finding of guilt. allowed to convict on the basis of the presumption alone. Since a "permissive inference" is merely one, but not the sole and sufficient, basis for a finding of guilt, there is no reason to require a greater degree of probative force for this sort of presumption than for other relevant evidence. 46 In short, the idea of requiring a "rational connection" for presumptions seems to have fallen by the wayside in Ulster County. 4 49 However, they added a critical second factor to the Court's analysis of presumptions as probabilistic inferences: the probability that an innocent person can exonerate himself (rebut the presumed fact) even in the presence of the proved fact. They argued that to assess the true magnitude of the "procedural hardship" imposed by a presumption, both factors must be considered. 50 46 It is one thing to enact a statutory presumption that is correct only 70% of the time, and quite another thing to enact such a statute when only one innocent person in a million would have any trouble rebutting the presumption. Conversely, a "rational connection" of 90% is less justifiable when no innocent person to whom the presumption applies could overcome the presumption. Ashford and Risinger conclude that " [o] ur courts cannot properly perform their function of safeguarding criminal defendants from the operation of presumptions which violate due process by relying on a rational connection test alone." Ashford & Risinger, supra note 37, at 185.
For example, if 90% of the persons who do A also commit the illegal act B, and of those who do A but not B, 90% can exonerate themselves, an erroneous conviction rate of only In a sense, the Court's mandatory-permissive distinction addresses the concern about wrongful convictions caused by the difficulty of rebuttal (exoneration). It is more difficult to rebut a presumption if the jury is mandatorily required, or allowed, to convict solely on the basis of the presumption; opportunities for exoneration are greater if the jury permissively makes a presumption-assisted decision in the context of the entire evidentiary record. Only in the latter case is evidence of particular facts relevant. Permissive presumptions are in fact rebuttable, because particularized evidence bolsters the decision to apply the presumption. If no defendant can rebut a permissive presumption, the jury is unlikely to have a particularized factual basis for applying it. Mandatory presumptions are more appropriate in such circumstances. 5 ' However, this "ease of exoneration" factor stubbornly and inherently resists quantification. Quantifying ease of exoneration would require data on the number of persons "actually" guilty, against which the number of innocent persons who are wrongfully convicted could be compared. 52 Such data are lacking in about 1.1% results. That is, of 100 people who did A, 90 will also have committed B and be correctly convicted; of the remaining 10 who did A but did not commit B, only one will be unable to exonerate himself and be erroneously convicted. Thus only one out of 91 was erroneously convicted. To take another example, if both rates are changed to 70%, a wrongful conviction percentage of about 11.4 results (i.e., 70 out of 100 are correctly convicted, plus 30% of the 30 innocent people, or 9 erroneous convictions, for a 9 out of 79 wrongful conviction rate).
Nevertheless, any statute that required many innocent people to exonerate themselves might be unacceptably "inquisitorial," however easy the exoneration. Ashford and Risinger address this point: "The criminal law should be scrutinized not only from the point of view of protecting innocent defendants against wrongful conviction. The principles implicit in the term 'probable cause' require us also to provide reasonable protections against the arrest and trial of innocent persons. " Id. at 191. 51. If, however, defendants are placed at a disadvantage when rebutting a permissive presumption, impermissible burden shifting might be hidden within that presumption. See notes 24, 37 supra; notes 54-71 infra and accompanying text (finding impermissible burden shifting when mandatory presumptions alter the burden of persuasion and rebuttal), especially note 70 (analyzing the jury instruction in Ulster County as mandatory rather than permissive).
52. The most controversial feature of the Ashford-Risinger model, and one that the mandatory-permissive distinction does not address, is the proposal that "acceptable" rates or levels of erroneous convictions be expressed in fairly specific mathematical or statistical terms. "[W]e submit," the authors state, "that a standard of precision approaching 99%, and certainly greater than 90%, should be required before a presumption can be constitutionally sustained consistent with notions of due process." Ashford & Risinger, supra note 37, at 183. "Percentages," the authors continue somewhat obscurely, "although not subject to precise determination, have a shorthand value in suggesting analogous subjective limitations upon the acceptable standard of imprecision .... " Id.; see also Broun & Kelly, Playing the Percentages principle, but they would be required to ensure that the mandatory-permissive distinction is being properly applied.
3
Thus, the mandatory-permissive distinction provides no easy or mechanical way of deciding criminal presumption cases. The Court must still rely on its own understanding of the effects of such presumptions on jurors. The Supreme Court has decided comparable statistical issues in civil discrimination cases. In doing so, the Court has indicated its consistent, if often unexpressed, approval of the 5% threshold level of statistical significance that is conventionally used in the social sciences. Since many of the discrimination studies have higher levels of accuracy, this standard translates into a "wrongful decision" rate of considerably less than 5% in the civil context.
D. Unconstitutional 'Mandatory' Presumptions and Burden Shifting
The closest the Court has come to making an explicit statement on its criteria ofstatistical proof is a famous footnote in Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) , a leading case in the race discrimination area. Castaneda concerned a Texas county with a 79.1% Mexican-American population, whose grand jury pools were only approximately 39% Mexican-American over a period of more than a decade. The Court stated: "As a general rule for such large samples, if the difference between the expected value and the observed number is greater than two or three standard deviations, then the hypothesis . . . would be suspect to a social scientist." Id. at 496 n.17. Two standard deviations would represent about a 5% margin of error, or a 95% level of confidence that the results reported did not occur merely by chance. In Castaneda, the observed number of Mexican-Americans differed from the expected number by about 29 standard deviations. According to the Court's calculations, the corresponding
• 140 probability that this disparity occurred by chance was less than 1 in 10 . In a subsequent case, Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U. S. 299 (1977) , a civil case also involving racial discrimination, the Court quoted approvingly the above cited language from Castaneda, but dropped the qualifying words "to a social scientist," which had previously suggested that the Court was simply referring to a convention adopted outside the legal context. Id. at 308 n.14. Lest one conclude that the social scientists necessarily have the last word in such matters, the Court inserted a vague disclaimer later in Hazelwood, cautioning that "Itihese observations are not intended to suggest that precise calculations of statistical significance are necessary in employing statistical proof .. " Id. at 
See note 70 infra.
embarked on a course of adjudication oddly against the tenor, if not the theory, of that case. The decisions in the cases following provide further evidence that Ulster County's mandatory-permissive distinction is an anomaly in the Court's jurisprudence and a departure from its due process precedents.
In Sandstrom v. Montana, 54 a unanimous Court held that a mandatory deliberate-homicide jury instruction (stating that "the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts") violated the Winship reasonable doubt standard. 55 A mandatory presumption is impermissible under Winship and Mullaney if it shifts the "burden of persuasion" to the defendant on an element of the crime with which he or she is charged. The Sandstrom Court reserved judgment on whether a mandatory presumption that shifts merely the "burden of production" is permissible.
56
Sandstrom applied a "rhetorical" analysis and the psychology of the "reasonable juror" to the task of reviewing presumptions. The Court noted that determining the nature of a presumption "requires careful attention to the words actually spoken to the jury. . . for whether a defendant has been accorded his constitutional rights depends upon the way in which a reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction. ' 5 7 After consulting the dictionary definition of "presume," and pondering the jury's likely reaction to being told that "the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts," the Sandstrom Court concluded that a "reasonable juror" might have interpreted the instruction as shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant on the dispositive issue of intent. 58 The judge in Sandstrom instructed the jury that the accused was presumed innocent until proved guilty and that the state had the burden of proving intent beyond a reasonable doubt. These general instructions, however, were "not rhetorically inconsistent with a conclusive or burden-shifting presumption," since the 54. 442 U.S. 510 (1979) . 55. Id. at 524. The Montana statute at issue defined "deliberate homicide" as "purposely or knowingly" causing the death of another human being. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102 (1978) .
56. Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 515, 519, 524 n.8; see also Francis v. Franklin, 105 S. Ct. 1965 , 1971 n.3 (1985 . But see Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 157 n.16 (suggesting that mandatory presumptions shifting the burden of production may also be unconstitutional The acts of a person of sound mind and discretion are presumed to be the product of the person's will, but the presumption may be rebutted. A person of sound mind and discretion is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts, but the presumption may be rebutted. 63 Again, the Court's analysis was a "rhetorical" one:
The challenged sentences are cast in the language of command. They instruct the jury that "acts of a person of sound mind and discretion are presumed to be the product of the person's will," and that a person "is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts," . . . These words carry precisely the message of the language condemned in Sandstrom
64
Although Franklin's jury, unlike Sandstrom's, was explicitly told that the presumptions "may be rebutted," the jury might well have concluded from the preceding mandatory language that it was required to infer intent to kill (which Franklin denied) as the natural and probable corollary of firing the gun (which Franklin admitted), unless the defendant persuaded the jury that such an inference was unwarranted. he law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts.' They were not told that they had a choice, or that they might infer that conclusion; they were told only that the law presumed it. It is clear that a reasonable juror could easily have viewed such an instruction as mandatory."); Francis, 105 S. Ct. at 1974 n.7 ("One would expect most of the juror's reflection about the meaning of the instructions to occur during [the] subsequent deliberative stage of the process. Under these circumstances, it is certainly reasonable to expect ajuror to attempt to make sense of a confusing earlier portion of the instruction by reference to a later portion of the instruction.").
69 . See Francis, 105 S. Ct. at 1980 , 1985 . But see id. at 1985 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (conceding the validity of the majority's "rhetorical" analysis: "It is true that the problems raised here probably could be alleviated if the words 'is presumed' were merely changed to 'may be presumed,' thereby making the presumption permissive 70. The differences between the majority and the dissenters in Ulster CountY turned largely on how to characterize the presumption at issue. One crucial clause of the jury instruction stated: "'[Under] these presumptions . . . upon proof of the presence of the machine gun and the hand weapons, [the jury] may infer and draw a conclusion that such prohibited weapon was possessed by each of the defendants who occupied the automobile . " Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 173 (Powell, J., dissenting). If the four dissenters are correct, this instruction allowed, or might have caused, the jury to base its decision on the presumption alone; the prosecution would then have been required to defend, as a general proposition, the presumption that people present in automobiles containing weapons are, beyond a reasonable doubt, the possessors of those weapons. Id. at 175-77. The possibility that the jury disbelieved all of the evidence and relied solely on the presumption was, according to the dissenters, simply ignored:
[T]he Court mischaracterizes the function of the presumption charged in this case ... . For all we know, the jury rejected all of the prosecution's evidence concerning the location and origin of the guns, and based its conclusion that respondents possessed the weapons solely upon its belief that respondents had been present in the automobile. The verdict in a "permissive presumption" case can run contrary to the jury's true beliefs. Ajudge's instruction on a permissive inference may, in effect, communicate a "mandatory" rule of law to the jury because of the general aura of legal authority surrounding the presumption or through the formal rhetoric by which it is conveyed. Without having to meet reasonable-doubt scrutiny, a permissive presumption may thus have the same effect as a mandatory presumption. The Supreme Court's concept of the "reasonable juror," and its conflicting accounts of the rhetorical effects of jury instructions, shed little light on the effect of permissive presumptions on jurors.
The influence exerted by judicial authority and legal formalism may, moreover, shift responsibility for decisions "upward," away from individual jurors, to what they perceive as the legitimate authority. Thesejury verdicts reflect not the "conscience of the community," but rather the impact of legal doctrine on the decisions of the jury.
Id. at 175-77 (citations and footnotes omitted).
The majority found, however, after close study of the judge's instructions and the jury verdict, that the presumption had been interpreted by the jury as permissive, and could thus be considered "as applied," or in the context of the entire record of evidence. Id at 160-66. The majority thus avoided a Leay-style examination of the presumption's general validity.
The majority's analysis neglects the possibility that a permissive presumption may impermissibly shift the burden of either production or persuasion. The Court must have assumed that the surrounding evidence was constitutionally sufficient to elevate the impermissible-ifmandatory presumption to the level of Winship scrutiny, and that the defendant had failed, or never attempted, to rebut either the presumption itself or the jury's bootstrap. The Court thus abandoned the requirement that a presumption be accurate beyond a reasonable doubt (in the application of generalized principles to particular circumstances) in favor of a "nexus" between the jury's unspoken, empirical beliefs and its acceptance of the prosecution's express, but undocumented, claim that the presumption is valid. See note 51 supra.
71. Compare Francis, 105 S. Ci. at 1975 n.8 ("the dissent would uphold this conviction based on an impressionistic and intuitive judgment that it was more likely that the jury understood the charge in a constitutional manner than in an unconstitutional manner") with id. at 1984 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting) ("Either the Court is attributing qualities to the average juror that are found in very few lawyers, or it perversely reads the instructions as a 'looking-glass charge' which, when held to a mirror, reads more clearly in the opposite direction.") (citing L.
CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLAss).
A. Misconceptions of the Effect of Presumptions on Jury Decisionmaking
According to current Supreme Court doctrine, if a presumption forms the sole basis for a conviction, that presumption "stands in stead" of the evidence and must satisfy the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 72 If, however, the jury does not rely solely on the presumption for a conviction, the "permissive" presumption is considered in the same manner as other evidence and need only satisfy the general requirements for admissibility of evidence. 73 The Court's reasoning is premised on the assumption that juries view permissive inferences as less binding on them than mandatory presumptions. Acceptance of a permissive presumption is theoretically purely voluntary. 74 But as the case of United States v. Gainey 75 demonstrates, this assumption is not as valid as it might initially appear.
The statutory presumption at issue in Gainey deemed presence at the site of an illegal still, if not explained to the satisfaction of the jury, "sufficient evidence to authorize conviction" for the substantive crime of carrying on an illegal distilling business. 76 Although the trial judge repeated this provision verbatim to the jury, his instructions also made it clear that mere unexplained presence at the site of an illegal still was not itself a crime nor necessarily inconsistent with innocence. 77 Thejudge specifically encouraged the jury to look beyond the language of the presumption to the entire record for evidence to support its verdict.
78
Although the majority in Gainey upheld the conviction as a proper application of the presumption, 79 Justice Black's point about the impact of authority on jury decisionmaking-that "permissive" presumptions have an effect they are not supposed to have-is timely and appropriate. The Supreme Court currently shows a strong inclination to characterize presumptions as "permissive" whenever possible, thereby granting them the benefits of lowered due process scrutiny.
'
Even in the case of rebuttable mandatory presumptions the Court is in profound disagreement about the effect of such instructions on jurors.
82
A number of legal and extra-legal studies cast considerable doubt on the Court's proposition that jurors understand permissive inferences as purely "optional" rules of law. Leary] that the jury had not relied on the presumption"); id. at 175-76 (Powell,J., dissenting) ("For all we know, thejury. . . based its conclusion. . . solely upon its belief that respondents had been present in the automobile. For purposes of reviewing the constitutionality of the presumption at issue here, we must assume that this was the case." (footnote omitted)); Leary, 395 U.S. at 31-32 ("For all we know, the conviction did rest on that ground. It has long been settled that when a case is submitted to the jury on alternative theories the unconstitutionality of any of the theories requires that the conviction be set aside. See, e.g., Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) ."); Tot, 319 U.S. at 469 ("[T]he statute in question . . . leaves the jury free to act on the presumption alone once the specified facts are proved, unless the defendant comes forward with opposing evidence. And this we think enough to vitiate the statutory provision."); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 235 (1911) ("The point is that. . . the statute authorizes the jury to convict. It is not enough to say that the jury may not accept that evidence as alone sufficient; for the jury may accept it, and they have the express warrant of the statute to accept it as a basis for their verdict.").
81. Background. Stanley Milgram's famous experiments on obedience support the general thesis that perceived authority can distort individuals' behavior and moral judgment. 8 7 In these experiments, Milgram asked unsuspecting volunteers to assume the role of a "teacher" in a learning exercise. The "teacher" was instructed to pose questions to a "learner" and to administer an electrical shock to the learner if he answered incorrectly. Milgram presented the experiment to the teacher as a study of the effects of punishment, or "negative reinforcement," on memory and learning. Actually, Milgram was testing the teacher for his willingness to administer the electrical shocks. The "learner" was a trained actor and a member of the experimental team who did not actually receive any shocks, although almost all of the 84. The remainder of this note examines and evaluates the implications of a number of empirical studies. The presentation and analysis of these studies are primarily "analogical" rather than strictly empirical. The studies to be examined shed only indirect light on the thesis under consideration. The widespread understanding of the applicability-as well as the limitations-of social psychological research in the realm of legal theory supports an analogical approach. See note 147 infra; L. FRIEDMAN Milgram demonstrated the important effects of authority systems on obedience. The level of obedience documented in Milgram's experiments depended upon the degree to which the subjects perceived their actions as subject to that authority. 8 9 Other rival explanations for the results-for example, the view that people are naturally cruel or sadistic-were disproved by careful variations of the basic experiment in which the subjects were able to choose whatever level of punishment they deemed appropriate. 90 "With numbing regularity," ordinary, decent, and responsible citizens were "seduced by the trappings of authority," by the control of their perceptions, and by their "uncritical acceptance of the experimenter's definition of the situation" into performing harsh and punitive acts they otherwise would never have performed. 9 1 Milgram induced in his subjects the impression that their actions were "mandated" by authority when, in fact, their participation in the experiment was voluntary and could be terminated by them at any time. 92
88. See S. MILGRAM, supra note 87, at 171-74. The "shocks" were given in a sequence running from 15 to 450 volts at 15-volt intervals. ME at 20. These voltage levels were clearly displayed on the experimental apparatus used by the teacher, as were verbal designations ranging from "slight shock" (15-60 volts) to "danger: severe shock" (375-450 volts). Id. at 20, 29. For every wrong answer, the subject was to administer the next highest shock in the series. Id. at 20-21.
The most important version of the experiment was one in which the teacher could hear the learner's verbal protests from an adjoining room. The learner's protests began at 120 volts with complaints, followed by demands to be released from the experiment (150 volts), agonized shouts (270 volts), refusal to answer further questions (300 volts), violent, vehement, and prolonged screams (315 volts), followed finally by dead silence (330 volts). Id. at 23. In these circumstances, the average level ofhighest shock administered was 368 volts, and 25 out of 40 subjects proceeded all the way up to the maximum level of 450 volts. Id. at 35.
Some continued to administer shocks on the assumption that the "learner" was by then dead.
Id. at 76, 87.
The experimental supervisor was an "impassive" and "somewhat stern" man dressed in a grey technician's coat. Id. at 16. If the subjects hesitated before administering a shock, the supervisor would calmly advise them that they were required to continue, and that the shocks, though painful, would cause "no permanent tissue damage." Id. at 19, 21. Further, when the subjects hesitated the supervisor would respond with a carefully tailored oral "prod," ranging from "Please continue," to "You have no other choice, you must go on." The supervisor maintained at all times a professional, "scientific" manner, and always spoke in an even, unemotional tone of voice. Milgram's experiments were conducted in a modem scientific laboratory by trained personnel who presided over a formidable array of scientific equipment. Undoubtedly, this environment enhanced the "trappings of authority" and contributed to the resuits. The "teachers' " expectations in these circumstances must have been that the "authorities" exercised rightful control and legitimate power. 9 3 This expectation was reinforced for the subjects by the apparently logical connection between the actions they were being asked to perform and the scientific goal of increasing knowledge about the nature of memory and learning. 94 Milgram thus established that individuals' actions flow not merely from their autonomous, moral propensities but are also strongly shaped by their expectations of what appears to be legitimate authority. 95 tions, requires comment. Subjects have learned from childhood that it is a fundamental breach of moral conduct to hurt another person against his will. Yet, almost half the subjects abandon this tenet in following the instructions of an authority who has no special powers to enforce his commands. To disobey would bring no material loss or punishment."); see also id. at 51 (subject insists that his participation is voluntary).
In perhaps the most pitiful and telling reaction to this false sense of obligation, many subjects offered to return the $4.50 they had already been paid for participating, if only they could discontinue shocking what they thought was a dying man. When the offers were refused, they continued their grim task. Id. at 47.
93. Milgram defines an authority system, reduced to its essentials, as "a minimum of two persons sharing the expectation that one of them has the right to prescribe behavior for the other." Id. at 142-43.
94. Although particular instructions of the supervisor might have been questioned, they generally appeared appropriate to the subjects when related to the overall goal of scientific progress. Cf id. at 141, 176, 187, 208 n.14. Residual, "background" authority was supplied by intangible factors such as a general ideological climate favorable to science and the "broad institutional accord" that permitted such activities to go on at all. For example, the very fact that the experiment was being conducted and tolerated in a civilized country implied social approval. 
PRESUMPTIONS
Implications. Milgram demonstrated that it was possible to structure situations in which perceived supervisory authority distorted and dominated individuals' beliefs in their actual freedom to disobey instructions. In many respects, Milgram's experiments are analogous to the legally "ordered" situation in which jurors are instructed to determine criminal liability in light of a permissive presumption.
96
Like Milgram's subjects, lay jurors in a criminal trial find themselves in an unfamiliar situation whose features are defined largely by traditional figures of authority. In the carefully controlled environment of the courtroom, the jurors hear and see only what the judge determines they will hear and see. Moreover, the jurors "report" to the judge, whom they view as their ultimate and only neutral source of legal authority. 97 When a judge instructs a jury on a permissive presumption, jurors attempt to follow it diligently, even if, upon later and more detached reflection, the inference might appear unduly harsh and This study differed from Milgram's in that the subjects' "authoritarian" tendencies were being tested, whereas Milgram picked "average" or "normal" subjects randomly and placed them in a context of strong authority. Nevertheless, to the extent that Milgram induced high obedience to authority in his subjects, they begin to resemble Bray and Noble's "high Ajudge may be likened to an experimenter as a strong authority figure who instructs jurors on the requirements of their roles as jurors. If the experimenter can successfully instruct his subjects by means available to the judge that the subject's own sense of fairness or equity is not relevant to his role as subject, then the judge should likewise be able to persuade jurors that their own personal senses of equity are not relevant to their roles as jurors. 97. See, e.g., Farley, Instructions to Juries-Their Role in the Judicial Process, 42 YALE L.J. 194, 212 (1932) ("[Slince. . .jurors are for the most part ordinary individuals, impressed by the solemnity and atmosphere of the court into an unwonted timidity and docility, the federal judge usually has it in his power, if he so wills, to mold a verdict in accord with his own views.").
in conflict with the jurors' personal views of the case. 98 Although the judge does not deliberately order a finding of guilt-and in fact assures the jury it is free to acquit the defendant-the jury naturally and normally assumes that the judge would not present the presumption unless it were a wise, sound, and accepted rule of law. 99 Although juries always have an absolute, unreviewable, and "sovereign" prerogative to bring in an acquittal no matter what instructions the judge provides, they are never explicitly told that they have this power.' 00 As Kalven and Zeisel conclude,
[T]he jury is not simply a corner gang picked from the street; it has been invested with a public task, brought under the influence of ajudge, and put to work in solemn surroundings. Perhaps one reason why the jury exercises its very real power so sparingly is because it is officially told it has none. 10 1 The whole context of authority surrounding the judge's instruction on a permissive presumption thus strongly encourages jurors to apply the inference. In this way, permissive presumptions function much like mandatory presumptions.
98.
Thejuror is told of his legal obligation to follow thejudge's instructions, but the juror is also likely to be aware of his sovereignty and of the ultimate end of his rolejustice in the individual case. When the juror perceives these two expectations as being in conflict (i.e., following the judge's instructions would not lead to an equitable result), he will still feel obligated to follow the judge's instructions unless the justification for disregarding those instructions is sufficiently compelling to permit the juror to follow his own notions ofjustice. Thus, the juror is expected to tolerate perceived inequity in the application of general rules of law to the point where he feels that the resulting inequity would be so great and so certain that his departure from the general law is justified. Note, supra note 96, at 1029-30 (footnotes omitted); see also Kadish & Kadish, The Institutionalization of Conflict:Jury Acquittals, 27J. Soc. IssuEs 199 (1971) .
These assumptions about jury behavior form an integral part of legal doctrine. See, e.g., Francis, 105 S. Ct. at 1976 n.9 ("The Court presumes that jurors, conscious of the gravity of their task, attend closely the particular language of the trial court's instructions in a criminal case and strive to understand, make sense of, and follow the instructions given them."); Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 73 (1979) ("A crucial assumption underlying [the jury] system is that juries will follow the instructions given them by the trialjudge. Were this not so, it would be pointless for a trial court to instruct ajury, and even more pointless for an appellate court to reverse a criminal conviction because the jury was improperly instructed."); id. at 75 n.7 ("The 'rule'--indeed, the premise upon which the system of jury trials functions under the American judicial system-is that juries can be trusted to follow the trial court's instructions.").
99. See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. at 237 ("The normal assumption is that thejury will follow the statute and, acting in accordance with the authority it confers, will accept as sufficient what the statute expressly so describes.").
100. See text accompanying notes 159-162 infra.
Rules of law and jury verdicts. The Simon experiments.
Background. A number of empirical studies describing the effects of formal legal rules illuminate juries' consideration of permissive presumptions. RitaJames Simon's study of experimental juries addressed the effect of legal rules on juries' verdicts in criminal cases. 1 0 2 Simon's juries each heard one of three recorded versions of two simulated trials, both involving the insanity defense. 0 3 One trial was closely modeled on the leading case of Durham v. United States. 10 4 The defendant in Durham, charged with housebreaking, pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity. The second trial was modeled on a case in which a charge of incest was defended on grounds of insanity. 0 5 In one version of each recorded trial, juries were instructed on insanity according to the M'Naghten rule: Exculpation is appropriate only if the defendant "is incapable of understanding the nature, quality and consequences of his acts, or of distinguishing between right and wrong. The jurors studied by Simon were "real"jurors in that they were drawn from the regular jury pools of their jurisdictions and were told by their judges that serving on an experimental jury was their way of fulfilling jury duty. However, one departure from normal procedure was the random assignment of all eligible jurors; no jurors were excluded by means ofperemptory challenges or challenges for cause. R. SIMON, supra, at 40.
103. R. SIMON, supra note 102, at 42-58. One of the advantages of using recorded trials for this sort of research is that many juries can be exposed to the same stimuli. Conclusions having a high degree of generality can be generated from a comparison of the verdicts of a large sample ofjuries. By systematically changing different variables and exposing many juries to different versions of a trial, the effects of these variables can be determined with a high degree of precision. Id. at 40. In both trials recorded by Simon the judges' instructions to the juries were treated as independent "variables. Cir. 1956 ). Simon considered King a "more typical" insanity case. R. SIMON, supra note 102, at 42.
106. R. SIMON, supra note 102, at 45. See M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843) (to establish an insanity defense, "it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.").
107. R. SIMON, supra note 102, at 45.
In the third version of each trial, juries were told simply that if they believed "the defendant was insane at the time he committed the act of which he was accused, then ...
[they] must find the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity."' 08 Simon found that juries deliberating under the M'Naghten rule were significantly less likely to acquit the defendant on grounds of insanity than those who were not instructed. A pre-deliberation survey of individual jurors for the housebreaking trial revealed that 76 percent of the uninstructed jurors were prepared to vote "not guilty by reason of insanity" (NGI), as opposed to only 59 percent of those given the M'Naghten instruction.' 0 9 In their pre-deliberation opinions in the incest trial, the uninstructed jurors were significantly more likely to acquit the defendant (34 percent NGI) than M'Naghten-instructed jurors were (24 percent NGI)." 0
The post-deliberation verdicts in the incest trials provided Simon's most interesting and instructive results."' Juries deliberating under the M'Naghten rule were significantly less likely to acquit the defendant on grounds of insanity (0 percent) than uninstructed (18 percent) or Durham-instructed (19 percent) juries. 11 2 Durham-instructed juries behaved much like uninstructed juries.'' From the incest cases, Simon concluded that "[w]hen jurors are permitted to deliberate in the absence of a court-defined criterion of responsibility, they are more likely to find in favor of the defendant, but no more likely than when they are instructed under the Durham formula." The similarity of results for uninstructed and Durham-instructed juries probably reflects the juries' sense that the Durham rule is something of a "non-instruction." Rather than providing a formal legal definition of insanity, the Durham rule may merely supply "a practical synonym for insanity.""1 5 In deciding cases under the Durham rule, jurors are thrown back on their own understanding of insanity. They do not have to fit the symptoms of insanity into the legal categories and criteria of a rule like that of M'Naghten, which, as Justice Cardozo remarked, "has little relation to the truths of mental life." '' 16 Implications. Jury deliberation under the M'Naghten instruction is similar to jury decisionmaking in the shadow of a legal presumption. The M'Naghten rule infects jury deliberations with "a legal test which color LITERATURE 106 (1931) ; see also Durham, 214 F.2d at 875-76 (jury should not be required to depend on "arbitrarily selected" symptoms that "do not necessarily, or even typically, accompany even the most serious mental disorder").
117. de Grazia, supra note 115, at 345-46 (footnotes omitted). According to one distinguished commentator, a M'Naghten-like formula also distorts the testimony of medical specialists on the issue of insanity: "I do not really feel that we psychiatrists want to preempt this whole area but we do resent having to focus on concepts in which, unfortunately, we have no When experimental jurors were forced to choose between a first-degree murder verdict or acquittal, 54% of the jurors found the defendant not guilty. But when "second degree mur-When a jury is instructed on a permissive presumption, an abstract legal rule is imposed upon the jury's decision. This rule does not necessarily frame the issues in ways that correspond to the jurors' ordinary, pre-legal understanding of the case. Nevertheless, as suggested by the Milgram and Simon studies, the authority with which the presumption is communicated can strongly orient-or, if necessary, reorient-the jurors' decisionmaking processes so as to bring them into conformity with the presumption. This "reorientation" seriously challenges the jury's obligation to act as "the conscience of the community" and to draw upon ordinary common sense in making its decisions. 1 19
C. Blurring the Mandatory-Permissive Distinction:
Legal Demonstrations
"The bite offormula" in capital sentencing procedures.
Legal scholars have examined the effects of formal legal rules on commonsensejury decisionmaking by studying the rhetoric of eighth amendment jury instructions in capital cases. 120 Under der" was added as a choice, 92% of the jurors found the defendant guilty of the lesser charge, none acquitted, and the percentage of first-degree findings declined from 46% to 8%. Id. at 215.
Other researchers have studied the effects of a mandatory death penalty sentencing statute on the decisions of simulated jurors. One study, for instance, found that jurors acquitted the defendant more often when the sentence was a mandatory death penalty than when it was a prison term (80% as opposed to 52% in one situation). Hester & Smith, Effects of a Mandatory Death Penalty on the Decisions of SimulatedJurors as a Function of Heinousness of the Crime, I J. CRIM. JUST. 319, 324-25 (1973) . Another study examined jurors' sensitivity to rhetorical variations in "reasonable doubt" instructions. Definitions of reasonable doubt ranging from "nearly any doubt about the defendant's guilt should qualify as a reasonable doubt" to "a reasonable doubt must be substantial, nontrivial, defensible," were given to different groups of experimental jurors at the end of otherwise identical simulated trials. Jurors given a lenient definition were significantly more willing to convict than those given a stringent definition. "This small variation at the end of a rather long and complex case produced a difference of over 26% in the group conviction rate. See, e.g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 204 (1971) (strongly opposing use of legal rules in capital punishment determinations).
122. Weisberg, supra note 85, at 363-65. 123. Id. at 364. 124. People v. Friend, 47 Cal. 2d 749, 760-61, 306 P.2d 463, 470 (1957) . Note also the jury's euphemistic avoidance of the word "death" ("the maximum penalty in a verdict of first degree murder") and its tendency to personify "the law." 125. Id. 126. Weisberg, supra note 85, at 369 ("[t] he jury instruction here is a sort of opaque anti-instruction, reminding the jurors anxious for guidance that the law refuses to give them any guidance").
January 1986] Post-Furman schemes have changed the rules and, thus, the rhetoric. Judges in many states now instruct juries on sentencing matters using formal legal language and purportedly systematic formulas for weighing aggravating against mitigating factors.' 27 However, these formulas may remain insufficient directives and may still prompt jury requests for additional guidance. In Neely, the jury requested "release" from the strictures of formal legal categories rather than guidance in applying the formula. It is somewhat perplexing that a jury, which can "weigh" mitigating circumstances as heavily as it wants, could find those circumstances outweighed by aggravating ones and still be reluctant to apply the death penalty. Weisberg analyzes this situation as follows:
The jurors must have engaged in a two-step process. First, they articulated some mitigating circumstances in express or legal terms. Second, they intuited some other reason that made them reluctant to choose a death sentence, but . . . they were unable to articulate it as a mitigating circumstance. The jurors may have learned rather clumsily to think in legal categories.
Having received a formal instruction from the judge, they became confused because they could not capture in legal language their own ideas or sentiments about the defendant's just By simply rereading the jury instruction and, in effect, reasserting the primacy of legal categories, the judge relieved the jury of its dilemma. Not surprisingly, jurors' behavior in these circumstances has been explicitly compared to the "teachers' " behavior in the Milgram studies:
The Milgram experiment bears an eerie similarity to the situa- 127. See id. at 371. 128. No. 40424 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. El Dorado Cty., Dec. 15, 1982) . 129. Record at 204, Neely; see also State v. Smith, 305 N.C. 691, 707-10, 292 S.E.2d 264, 274-75 (1982) (similar exchange between judge and jury).
130. See Weisberg, supra note 85, at 375 ; see also id. at 383 ("The formal, legalistic image of the law of capital punishment that the jury now receives from the court and the prosecutor is often a great advantage to the state.").
[Vol. 38:423 tion of Neely's penalty jury in Placerville, California. The jury in that case asked the judge what personal moral responsibility it had over the defendant's life. The judge responded with the nonanswer of repeating the more legalistic of the technical jury instructions, essentially telling the jury it had no responsibility. In the very special situation of the criminal courtroom and the death penalty trial, it seems fairly plausible that a lay jury exposed to the mystifying language of legal formality may indeed allow its moral sense to be distorted.
132
D. The Practical Effects of Perceived Authority and Formal Legal
Rules on Jury Decisionmaking 1. Jurors' abdication of responsibility to higher authority.
Milgram's "teachers" sought to allay personal concerns about responsibility for their actions. They often sought explicit assurances that the supervisor would "accept all responsibility" for their actions. After receiving such assurances, most subjects appeared relieved and proceeded to administer shocks to the "victim. Such statements are not simple alibis invented in response to guilt. Rather, deference to authority is a fundamental mode of thinking that accompanies the perception of oneself as "locked 132. Id. at 392. Weisberg also commented: "Professional actors in legal institutions rely on doctrine to reassure themselves that the sanctions they inflict follow inevitably from the demands of neutral, disinterested legal principles rather than from their own choice and power. If the death penalty decision contains these moral and psychological elements at least to some degree, then one could indeed sensibly say that the legal formulas 'distort' the decision. If the decision to kill is indeed fraught with personal moral intensity, arousing the sentencer's most intense fears and anxieties, then it may be a harmful illusion for the juror to believe that he or she is choiceless. Id. at 391.
133. See S. MILGRAM. supra note 87, at [7] [8] 187. 134. Id. at 146. 135 . Id. at 8. The results of the "control" version of the experiment (in which the subjects themselves decided what levels of shocks to administer) confirm that such statements are accurate. See note 90 supra.
136. S. MILGRAM, supra note 87, at 6; see also id. at 10 ("Some derived satisfaction from their thoughts and felt that-within themselves, at least-they had been on the side of the angels.").
into a subordinate position in a structure of authority." 1 37 Milgram's subjects lack, or come to lack in the experimental circumstances, the strength of conviction required to disobey the authority figure. In novel and disorienting situations of this sort, individuals usually respond to internal conflict by adjusting their beliefs so that they perceive themselves as not fully responsible for their actions. In a sense, individuals shift responsibility for their actions "upward" to the perceived legitimate authority.' 3 8
Simon's research also demonstrated how legal rules shift perceptions of responsibility. Traditional juries deliberating prior to M'Naghten would have resembled Simon's uninstructed juries. These pre-M'Naghten juries would have proceeded on the premise that "'[their] collective conscience does not allow punishment where it cannot impose blame' " and that they were supposed to apply " '[their] inherited ideas of moral responsibility to individuals prosecuted for crime.' "139 By contrast, the M'Naghten instruction substituted the authority of a "legal conundrum" (whether the defendant knew right from wrong) for the jurors' lay sense ofjustice or equity (whether the defendant was insane).' 40 It is clear that jurors' sense of "responsibility" for their decisionmaking was significantly altered by variations in the legal rules. As one measure of this phenomenon, Simon reported that the M'Naghten instruction reduced the number ofjuror contributions to group verdict discussions.' 4 '
137.
Id. at 8. 138. Id. at 7-8, 145-46. This behavior may be understood in terms of the social psychological theory of "cognitive dissonance." When two or more beliefs are consistent, individuals experience a satisfying state of "consonance"; when two or more beliefs are inconsistent, an unpleasent state of "dissonance" results. Professor Festinger has suggested that people are motivated to reduce cognitive dissonance and that they attempt to do so by changing their attitudes or beliefs. 141. See R. SIMON, supra note 102, at 74-76. "Juror contributions" refers to the total number of times individual jurors spoke in the group's deliberation. Simon reported the following results for 39 randomly selected juries in the incest trial: Uninstructed-496 verbal contributions (13 juries); M'Naghten-257 verbal contributions (12 juries); Durhan-564 verbal contributions (14 juries). For the same 39 juries, the mean number of pages in the transcriptions of the juries' deliberations was 43 for uninstructed; 26 for MA'Aaghten; 45 for Durham.
By each measure, juries considered the uninstructed and Durham-instructed decisions longer and with more participation than the M'Naghten-instructed decisions: "If length of deliberation is at all a valid index of the difficulty of the jurors' task or of the jurors' involve-2. Doctrinal shifting sub silentio.
In response to the foregoing, it might be argued that the whole point of these legal rules is to change the substantive law, so as to limit or restrict the discretion of the jury and thereby make acquittals harder to obtain. However, this analysis fails to distinguish between the legitimate purpose and effect of legal rules and the often illegitimate effects such rules have on juries. An "illegitimate" effect is one that exists in the real world but not in legal doctrine and that undermines sub silentio the traditional functions of jury deliberation and decisionmaking. Legal doctrine is heavily influenced by assumptions about human social psychology and behavior, but sometimes those assumptions cannot withstand modern scientific scrutiny.
Social psychological experiments are particularly useful in testing underlying assumptions about human behavior because these studies create controlled situations in which specific variables can be isolated, analyzed, and measured. 91 (1967) (the insanity test is "a normative standard applied to conflicting clusters of fact and opinion by a jury, an institution which is the traditional embodiment of community morality and, therefore, well suited to determining whether a particular defendant, and his act, warrant condemnation rather than compassion").
142. Both laypersons and a panel of experts severely underestimated the influence of authority on obedience. See S. MILGRAIi, supra note 87, at 30-31.
143. Guttmacher, supra note 117, at 174 (" 'I do not see why the rules of law should be arrested at the state of psychological knowledge of the time when they were formulated. ...
[T]he M'Naghten Rules are in large measure shams.' "); see also id. at 177-79 (judicial or jury role should not be forced on psychiatrists, but trust in sound judgment of court and jury is warranted only when medical data can be fully and accurately presented).
144. See Weisberg, supra note 85, at 388-89 ("The availability of the sort of legal formulas that the Supreme Court has encouraged. . . may cause some jurors to vote for the death penalty where they might otherwise be inclined to afford mercy. . . . [T]he law might permit These demonstrations help to clarify the legal-doctrinal analysis of presumptions.1 45 Taken together, the empirical and legal analyses strongly suggest that the "dignifying formalities" of an authoritative legal presumption carry significant weight with juries and reduce their sense of responsibility and moral sensitivity. An aura of authority, professionalism, and experience surrounds permissive presumptions because they have been found sufficiently reasonable and reliable to receive the official legal imprimatur of the state.14 6 Furthermore, a presumption based on sound empirical generalizations may well be logically connected with valid penological objectives and policy considerations. Jurors faced with difficult choices may understandably place the responsibility for their decisions on higher authorities associated with permissive presumptions, even if the outcomes run counter to their personal and moral propensities. 147 a sentencer to rationalize a death sentence which his moral sentiments oppose .
); see also id. at 388-95.
145. See text accompanying notes 75-80 supra. 146. See, e.g., Weisberg, supra note 85, at 352 ("A jury facing a difficult moral judgment on the basis of lots of raw evidence is likely to be somewhat affected by the idea that the legislature had placed a special imprimatur on the defendant's criminal record .... ").
147. The support these studies offer for the hypothesis may be characterized as indirect or analogical, requiring a leap in reasoning from experimental conditions to jurors' real-life behavior. These studies were not specifically designed to test the effects of permissive and mandatory presumptions on juries. Given judges' reluctance to allow experiments on actual juries, research based on mock juries remains the best available empirical approach. See R. HASTIE Milgram discussed three methodological problems associated with his experiments: (1) the possibility that his subjects were not representative of the general population; (2) the possibility that they did not believe they were really administering shocks to the learner; and (3) the problem of generalizing from the laboratory to the larger world. Milgram easily refuted the first two objections. See S. MILGRAM, supra note 87, at 169-74. On the third point, Milgram noted that the problem of generalization "depends entirely on whether one has reached a correct theoretical understanding of the relevant process." Id. at 174. Perhaps "structure" is a better word than "process" for what Milgram had in mind. The claim is that a correct understanding of the general structure of authority can be developed by analyzing how individuals become instruments of authority in specific circumstances. "The occasion we term a psychological experiment shares its essential structural properties with other situations composed of subordinate and superordinate roles.
... Id. at 175. "[Tlhe essence of obedience, as a psychological process, can be captured by studying the simple situation in which a man is told by a legitimate authority to act against a third individual." Id. at 177.
Certainly, differences between Milgram's experimental situation and that ofajury should be noted: Thejury is acting as a group (Milgram also tested this variation, id. at ch. 9, "Group Effects"); the defendant is not a "volunteer"; and in fact the defendant has probably done something very bad. But if Milgram is correct in claiming to have discerned a "common psy-phrase was used a year later in United States v. Spock.' 5 6 The trial judge in Spock had given the jury a special interrogatory, consisting of ten questions to be answered if the jury reached a general verdict of guilty. The reviewing court expressed concern about this form of "judicial pressure" and about the "subtle, and perhaps open, direct effect that answering special questions may have upon the jury's ultimate conclusion. . .. Ajuror, wishing to acquit, may be formally catechized."' 157 Even when confronting formally proper questions, "the jury, as the conscience of the community, must be permitted to look at more than logic." 158 The same is true for formally proper presumptions.
The importance of such extra-legal considerations is explicitly recognized in the theory of jury nullification. 1 59 The main issue in jury nullification debates is whether the jury must enforce the law as prescribed by the judge or may make an independent decision as to whether the defendant's conduct constituted a crime. The prevailing answer is that the jury has an unreviewable, "sovereign" prerogative to acquit on the basis of its conscience-"in the teeth of both law and facts"1 60 -but that the jury cannot be told it has this power.
1 61 tution of the jury does not function properly ifjurors reluctantly acquiesce before the aura of authority vested in judicial instructions on presumptions (and other rules of law) rather than enforce the dictates of their conscience. In such circumstances, defendants are denied their right to due process of law, and sodety is deprived of the opportunity to express its vital interests in ways that affirm contemporary standards of behavior.' 64
III. CONCLUSION
The legal analysis presented in Part I suggests that the mandatory-permissive distinction is incompatible with the Court's due process precedents. The empirical studies considered in Part II suggest that the distinction is illusory. Permissive presumptions can have essentially the same function and effect as mandatory presumptions in the deliberations of a jury. The mandatory-permissive distinction does not effectively differentiate between permitted levels of accuracy for empirical generalizations. Therefore, all presumptions should be treated as "mandatory" and their empirical premises subjected to reasonable-doubt scrutiny.
Eliminating the mandatory-permissive distinction would prevent the difficult problems of characterization exemplified by Ulster County-the very case that set forth the distinction. 65 Determining whether the jury might have relied solely on a presumption to convict involves difficult factual inquiries, beginning with, but not limited to, the actual language of the presumption. (need to promote public acceptance of verdicts explains many evidentiary rules and other aspects of the trial process); Tribe, supra note 52, at 1376 (" [T] here was a wisdom of sorts even in trial by battle-for at least that mode of ascertaining truth and resolving conflict reflected well the deeply felt beliefs of the times and places in which it was practiced."); Note, 167 Reviewing courts should be extremely hesitant to resolve these fact-specific disputes and to declare that a jury could not have relied solely on a presumption to convict. Legal doctrine becomes socially invalid when it depends on assumptions about human nature that do not stand up to modern scientific scrutiny. 68 Removing the mandatory-permissive distinction would help to focus reviewing courts' attention on a less fact-specific dispute-whether the presumption is empirically valid. Eliminating the distinction also better conforms the law of presumptions to the demands of due process. The Court in Winship emphasized the fundamental bias of the criminal law against erroneous convictions. 69 That bias is expressed in such substantive and procedural features of the criminal law as the "presumption of innocence," the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the refusal to allow appeals of criminal acquittals, and the refusal to direct guilty verdicts. 170 The proposal advanced here reorients presumption doctrine in accordance with that bias by ensuring that no jury can convict upon proof of a fact satisfying only a "more likely than not" standard. Preventing mischaracterization of presumptions that are not highly accurate, which then could be used as a jury's sole basis for conviction, ensures reasonable-doubt scrutiny of "every fact necessary to constitute the crime."''
The Winship Court clearly indicated that the alternative of erroneous convictions presents far graver social costs than the possibility of an occasional erroneous acquittal. 72 Finally, this note encourages a shift in the "balance of power" between juries, judges, and legislatures. Two features of juries have been stressed: their "political" function in representing and expressing the vital interests of the community at a criminal trial, and their moral duty to reach decisions in accordance with their conscience. These features would be enhanced if juries were less pressured to follow permissive presumptions that do not satisfy reasonable-doubt scrutiny. 173 As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, presumptions are simply empirical generalizations, and they must have a basis in ordinary experience. 174 Prosecutors are free to draw juries' attention to the underlying factual connections that prompt legislatures to create particular permissive presumptions in the first place. But without judicial instructions on such presumptions, juries can more freely assess those factual inferences and determine whether they indeed apply to particular defendants in specific cases. 175 
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173. See note 4 supra (explaining the inapplicability of the argument from comparative convenience in the criminal context). Note that the reasonable-doubt standard does not itself ensure the requisite statistical accuracy of presumptions. Rather, it phrases the implicit value choice of accuracy in terms that the jury can understand and interpret, thus implicating the jury's political and moral functions.
174. See text accompanying notes 9-24 supra. 175. Even if the mandatory-permissive distinction is abolished, juries may still be impermissibly influenced by mandatory presumptions to disregard their moral and social beliefs. Reviewing courts should thus continue to consider jury-influencing effects in their reasonable-doubt review of generalized, presumptive inferences.
